THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply provisions of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. * * * Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). The Supreme Court has recognized an implied "private right of action to enforce [Title IX's] prohibition on intentional sex discrimination," see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690-93, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which includes actions for monetary damages by private persons and "encompasses intentional sex discrimination in the form of a recipient's deliberate indifference." Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005). While the Court has recognized that this right of action extends to students and employees, it has never expressly restricted it to those two categories of plaintiffs. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998); North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982). In fact, the Court has stated that "Title IX ... broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to 'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex.'" Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Sexual harassment, moreover, "can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX." Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Doe v. Brown University, 896 F. 3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018).
