This monograph explores the role of sequels in the process of operational design. The complexity and resiliency of today's armies has made the design of campaigns to achieve strategic ends an increasingly difficult undertaking. Campaign planners must contend with many factors not the least of which is understanding the need to develop operations which extend the depths of time and space. The operational commander must be prepared to fight multiple battles, multiple operations, or even multiple campaigns in his quest for victory. However, ever present uncertainty can make planning for subsequent actions a difficult process. Whether or not the operational commander can see the future with sufficient clarity to make the detailed planning of sequels useful will be the subject of this monograph. This paper seeks to answer that question through the use of a two part methodology. First the theoretical basis for sequels, their historical development, and their relationship with operational design are examined. Next a number of historical cases are considered to determine if sequels have been employed in the past or if sequenced planning has been merely an afterthought of historians. On the basis of the analysis of the theoretical foundation of sequels and historical example, the monograph concludes that sequels are a critical part of operational design which commanders must address in campaign planning. In addition, a number of parameters are established which must govern the creation of sequels. Summarized, these basic guidelines include the need to maintain a constant focus on the end state, an application of the elements of campaign design so that they can support continuous operations, and an appreciation of the role of initiative and freedom of action. The paper suggests the importance of sequels to operational design and the parameters for their employment ought to receive consideration by the U.S. military establishment as it develops joint operational doctrine.
